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Category: Domestic Policy (Last Updated May 25, 2026)

In the first year of the administration, the government pivoted from establishing a sovereign wealth fund to enabling different parts of the government to take direct equity stakes, with the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in the lead.

The Starting Point

The initial focus of the White House, as emphasized during the campaign, was exploring the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund. On February 3, 2025, Executive Order 14196 was signed to support that initiative.

Excerpt #1: P. 70 | Chapter III: “Principles and Policies”

“In creating a sovereign wealth fund, the Trump administration will seek to partner with the largest sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf to bring investment into America. There will be a steady stream of private sector engagement, just as in the first term.”

Excerpt #2: p. 72 | Chapter III: “Principles and Policies”

The Current Read

Establishing a sovereign wealth fund and consolidating existing assets has proven to be a tall order that would require complex legislation. Instead of that pursuit, the Trump administration has enabled multiple government agencies and departments to build a portfolio of holdings through a range of instruments, including direct equity ownership.

The Development Finance Corporation, through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) passed late last year, now has a revolving $5 billion equity account at the US Department of the Treasury. In addition, it is permitted to have up to $200 billion of total holdings, with up to $70 billion in equity. In that sense, DFC is taking on the standing of a sovereign fund. Its remit has also expanded beyond developing markets to include U.S. allies.

The focus of the DFC, as well as the government's overall holdings, is on critical technology sectors and upstream requirements, such as critical minerals. The US Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of War (DoW) are also active on this front. While the Intel announcement, in which the US government acquired a stake in the company, took prominence, subsequent deals in quantum computing and critical minerals have shown this is a pattern. In these types of agreements, Commerce and the DoW seem to be more active than DFC.

The sprawl of activity and holdings may require consolidation, at which point an SWF may come back into the spotlight. For now, tracking the hydra of holdings requires careful attention.

People shaping the policy*

• Benjamin Black, CEO DFC

• Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce

• Scott Bessent, Treasury Secretary

• Steve Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of War

• Jacob Helberg, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth

*Further background for individuals available in Trump 2.5

Notable milestones

• SWF Executive Order – February 3, 2025

• Intel Stake Acquired – August 22, 2025

• Korea Zinc Deal Announced – December 14, 2025

• NDAA 2026 Passed – December 18, 2025

• Quantum Computing Grants – May 21, 2026

Additional Resources

• Executive Order 14196

• DFC Modernization Act of 2025

• Intel Warrant and Stock Agreement

• Council on Foreign Relations | Washington’s Growing Portfolio: Tracking U.S. Government Investments

Note that this is an open preview, and future posts will be available for paid subscribers.

Category: Foreign Policy (Last Updated May 10, 2026)

The administration is pursuing American dominance in the Western Hemisphere and the removal of influence by other major global powers in adversarial states and allies alike.

The Starting Point

At the outset of the administration, it was immediately clear that the focus was on prioritizing not just America-friendly governments but also Trump-friendly leaders. The first-order concern – borders and immigration – was achieved relatively quickly within three months. This opened the door to pursuing the overall objective of hegemony early on in the administration.

Excerpt #1: P. 66 | Chapter III: Principles and Policies

“As the U.S. in the Trump 2.5 era seeks Western hegemonic dominance, it will not accept Chinese influence in Cuba and Venezuela. In Cuba’s case, given its proximity to the U.S. border, there may even be hints at regime change through economic pressure.”

Excerpt #2: p. 67 | Chapter III: “Principles and Policies”

The Current Read

The White House formalized its policy in the Western hemisphere within two key documents: National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.

The approach is characterized as an expanded Monroe doctrine, which has also been reframed in the media as the ‘Donroe’ doctrine. At the core is the reinforcement of a zone of exclusion in the Americas, whereby the United States’ writ is paramount, particularly in confronting Chinese (and at times Russian) influence.

There are other overriding concerns that precipitate American action or intervention:

• Interdiction of the drug trade

• Combating illegal migration

• Achieving geostrategic energy dominance

To achieve these aims, there are ongoing attempts at regime alteration, either through the electoral process or outside it. This played out in Honduras (electorally) and Venezuela (militarily) within the first year, for example. Brazil and Colombia will soon be significant tests for the White House’s approach. In fact, every electoral cycle could be a flashpoint.

It is less clear what role the Shield of the Americas, a new body, will evolve into and if it will transition beyond pageantry into substance. The primary interlocutors for the United States in co-leadership are El Salvador, Argentina, and Chile, and to a lesser degree, Ecuador and other Central American countries. Canada and Mexico, while within the Americas, have a broader policy context for the administration as the only two countries bordering the United States.

Finally, as in all other regions, advancing American prosperity and achieving a trade surplus, including through tariffs, is also the policy du jour in the Americas.

People shaping the policy*

• Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

• Pete Hegseth, Secretary of War

• Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury

• Michael Jensen, Senior Director, National Security Council

• Kirsti Noem, Special Envoy, Shield of the Americas

*Further background for individuals available in Trump 2.5

Notable milestones

• Ecuador Election (runoff) – April 13, 2025

• Chile Election – November 16, 2025

• Honduras Election – November 30, 2025

• Venezuela Intervention – January 3, 2026

• Costa Rica Election – February 1, 2026

• Shield of the Americas Summit – March 7, 2026

• Colombia Election – May 31, 2026

• Peru Election (Runoff) – June 7, 2026

• Brazil Election – October 4, 2026

• Argentina Election – October 24, 2027

Additional Resources

• GEOPOLITICO | Victory in Venezuela

• White House | National Security Strategy (November 2025)

• Bloomberg | How Trump’s Venezuela intervention revived the Monroe Doctrine

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